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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4561 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EDMUND BRUCE FIELDS,  
                              Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Action No. 2:03-cr-00289-001) 
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 24, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 23, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
The instant appeal arises from the District Court’s denial of Appellant Edmund 
Bruce Fields’ (“Appellant”) 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence.  As grounds 
for relief, Appellant had argued ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his 
2 
attorney failed to procure certain documents and testimony that would have altered the 
outcome of a suppression hearing.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s denial of Appellant’s motion. 
I.     Facts and Procedural History 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 
essential to our discussion.  In March 2003, Canonsburg Police Department Detective 
Charles Tenney (“Detective Tenney”) effectuated an investigatory stop of a pickup truck 
in which the Appellant was a passenger.  Detective Tenney had stopped the truck because 
he recognized another passenger, Anthony “Crazy Boy” Hutchinson, from his work with 
the Washington County Drug Task Force (the “Task Force”).  Not only was Detective 
Tenney familiar with Hutchinson’s prior illicit activities but, a month before the stop, 
another Task Force agent had mentioned the existence of an outstanding warrant for 
Hutchinson’s arrest.  Following the stop, the police conducted a pat-down search of 
Appellant’s person and discovered that he was in possession of ammunition for a 
revolver that was located inside the truck, roughly $1300 in cash, and a razor blade with 
white powdery residue.  Another search, this time at the police station, revealed heroin in 
Appellant’s shoe. 
Appellant was subsequently indicted and charged with (1) possession with intent 
to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 
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U.S.C. § 924(c); and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
Prior to his trial, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing 
that the investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment.1  At the suppression hearing, 
Detective Tenney testified regarding his familiarity with Hutchinson and about the 
warrant for his arrest.2
                                                 
1 In point of fact, the suppression hearing focused not only on the investigatory stop, but 
on the subsequent searches.  (See App. at 46-47.)  However, because Appellant’s § 2255 
motion concerned only the investigatory stop aspect, (see id. at 33-39), we will confine 
our discussion to that specific issue. 
  When pressed on cross-examination, the detective noted that, 
while he could not remember specifically who had informed him of the warrant, it may 
have been an “Agent Sepic.”  (App. at 134.)  The detective also stated that he had radioed 
2 In relevant part, Detective Tenney testified as follows: 
A.  Hutchinson is known to me from calls within our jurisdiction and 
has been known to sell — allegedly sells heroin and is involved in gang 
activity in the City of Pittsburgh. 
Q.  And did you know anything about whether Mr. Hutchinson was 
wanted on any outstanding warrants at the time this car drove through the 
headlights of your vehicle? 
 . . .  
A.  I was — I worked on an Attorney General’s Task Force also at 
the time.  One of the agents advised me, “Hey, we’re looking for Crazy 
Boy.  There’s warrants for him now,” for unrelated charges in another 
county, I believe, I’m not sure; and he was entered into NCIC. 
Q.  Okay.  How long before — approximately how long before this 
incident on March 7th, 2003, had you been advised by someone on the 
Attorney General’s Task Force that Hutchinson was wanted? 
A.  It was over a period of several months that I talked to them.  I 
think it dates back to January, and then we obviously worked cases together 
the whole time, so I really couldn’t tell you.  Maybe a month; I couldn’t tell 
you.  It could have been three weeks, a month. 
(App. at 117-18.) 
4 
dispatch to confirm the existence of the warrant prior to stopping the truck.  Based on this 
testimony, the District Court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.   
Appellant was subsequently tried and convicted as to Count One and Count Three 
(though only insofar as it related to possession of ammunition).  After the trial, Appellant 
filed a supplemental motion to suppress the evidence against him.  This time, however, 
Appellant attached documents that had been produced after the suppression hearing 
reflecting the radio communications between Detective Tenney and the police dispatchers 
(the “dispatch records”).  The dispatch records indicated that, contrary to Detective 
Tenney’s testimony during the hearing, he had not received confirmation of the 
outstanding warrant until after he effectuated the investigatory stop.  Nonetheless, the 
District Court denied the supplemental motion, holding that the investigatory stop was 
proper. 
We affirmed Appellant’s conviction in a 2006 not precedential opinion and held, 
among other things, that the District Court had not erred in denying the motions to 
suppress.  See United States v. Fields, 176 F. App’x 327, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2006).  While 
we noted the existence of ambiguity as to whether Detective Tenney in fact received 
confirmation prior to stopping the truck, we deemed the matter irrelevant “in light of our 
conclusion that Tenney’s personal knowledge [of Hutchinson and the outstanding 
warrant] was sufficient” to justify the investigatory stop.  Id. at 328 n.2.  We remanded 
the case for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
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Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a term of 210 months’ imprisonment and 
several years of supervised release. 
In July 2008, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  In this motion, Appellant argued that his counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to 
obtain and introduce the dispatch records during the suppression hearing and (2) failing 
to challenge Detective Tenney’s testimony that another Task Force member informed 
him of the outstanding warrant on Hutchinson.  (Appellant Br. at 18-20.)  The District 
Court disagreed, finding that the “[t]rial counsel’s failure to obtain the [dispatch records 
was] irrelevant.  Both this Court and the Court of Appeals found that Tenney’s reliance 
on his personal knowledge was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that 
Hutchinson was involved in criminal activity” and thus justified the investigatory stop.  
(App. at 5.)  Consequently, the District Court denied Appellant’s § 2255 motion and 
granted a certificate of appealability. 
II.     Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction to rule on Appellant’s motion pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253.  Given that the District Court denied Appellant’s § 2255 motion without 
holding a hearing, our review is plenary.  United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294, 297 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
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III.     Analysis 
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must satisfy 
a two-prong inquiry.  United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  Specifically, Appellant must 
demonstrate that “(1) his or her attorney’s performance was, under all the circumstances, 
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms . . . and (2) [that] there is a ‘reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been 
different.’”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. 
This is no easy task.  As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, 
“scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and we must therefore 
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689.  It thus falls to Appellant to “overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Since it is not the role of 
this Court to heedlessly cast aspersions on Appellant’s counsel, “[i]f it is easier to dispose 
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course 
should be followed.”  Id. at 697.  Therefore, we will consider whether Appellant was 
prejudiced due to his attorney’s allegedly unreasonable actions in handling the motion to 
suppress.  See Day, 969 F.2d at 42. 
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As discussed above, the suppression hearing concerned, among other things, the 
admissibility of evidence gathered as a result of an investigatory stop.  Since “stopping a 
car and detaining its occupants constitute[s] a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment,” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985), the effectuating police 
officer must have a “reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts,” that 
the vehicle’s occupants are involved in criminal activity.  Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979)).  “To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, [the 
court] must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.’”  United 
States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)).   
The District Court held that one basis for Detective Tenney’s reasonable suspicion 
was his confirmation “that a passenger in the vehicle, Hutchinson, had a warrant out for 
his arrest.”  (App. at 63.)  Since the dispatch records seem to indicate that this 
confirmation came only after Detective Tenney had already stopped the car, introducing 
them at trial could have undermined Detective Tenney’s testimony and could have 
undermined this particular basis for a finding of “reasonable suspicion.”  Nonetheless, we 
find that this would not have resulted in a different outcome in the suppression hearing. 
As we noted in our 2006 decision, “the District Court also found that ‘because 
Tenney worked on the [Task Force],’ he had personal knowledge ‘that there was an 
active bench warrant for Hutchinson.’  This knowledge is itself sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion.”  Fields, 176 F. App’x at 330 (quoting the District Court’s 
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suppression hearing opinion).  Indeed, in dismissing the § 2255 motion, the District Court 
reaffirmed its holding by noting that it had “found the stop reasonable because 
[Detective] Tenney was personally aware of Hutchinson’s gang activity, as well as 
allegations of his involvement in drug trafficking.”  (App. at 5.)  The dispatch records do 
nothing to undercut this basis for finding that Detective Tenney had a reasonable 
suspicion.  To the contrary, as Appellee rightly points out in its Opposition Brief, the 
dispatch records would have “confirmed [Detective Tenney’s] personal prior knowledge 
about the outstanding arrest warrant for Hutchinson.”  (Appellee Br. at 19.) 
Appellant responds that his attorney could have challenged this secondary basis 
for finding reasonable suspicion by subpoenaing Agent Sepic to testify at the suppression 
hearing.3
                                                 
3 Appellant also argues that his counsel “failed to otherwise hold the Government to its 
burden on this issue by producing the officer who allegedly provided the information to” 
Detective Tenney.  (Appellant Br. at 19-20.)  We see no merit in this argument given our 
2006 holding that Detective Tenney’s testimony as to personal knowledge, standing 
alone, was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion.  See Fields, 176 F. App’x at 330. 
  (Appellant Br. at 19-20.)  We do not agree.  After testifying that “one of the 
agents” on the Task Force informed him of the existing warrant, (App. at 118), Detective 
Tenney offered during cross-examination that “it may have been Attorney General Agent 
Sepic; I’m not sure . . . Maybe Attorney General Agent Sepic; I’m not sure which agent.  
We worked with a lot of agents,” (id. at 134 (emphasis added)).  At most, Agent Sepic 
could have testified that he was not the agent who had informed Detective Tenney of the 
outstanding warrant on Hutchinson.  However, given Detective Tenney’s equivocation, 
this testimony would have done little to undercut his assertion that some agent had 
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informed him of the outstanding warrant, and, in light of our 2006 holding, does little to 
“undermine confidence in the outcome” of the suppression hearing.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694.4
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that there was a “reasonable probability” of a 
contrary outcome had his attorney introduced the dispatch records and Agent Sepic’s 
testimony during the suppression hearing.   
 
IV.     Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Appellant’s § 2255 motion. 
                                                 
4 We are cognizant of the note in our 2006 opinion that Appellant “does not contest 
Detective Tenney’s testimony that another Task Force agent informed Tenney of the 
existence of an active warrant for Hutchinson.”  Fields, 176 F. App’x at 330 n.3.  
However, on the facts of the instant case, we see no reason why the kind of token 
resistance suggested by Appellant would sway our decision — or influence the outcome 
of the suppression hearing.  This is particularly true if Appellant also argues that his 
counsel should have submitted the dispatch records.  As noted above, these records 
would have only served to support Detective Tenney’s testimony. 
